Mark Technologies Corp., a California Corporation, and Mark Jones, Plaintiffs/Appellants, vs. Utah Resources International Inc., a Utah Corporation, John Fife, David Fife, Lyle D. Hurd, Jr., Gerry Brown, individuals, Defendants/Appellees : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Mark Technologies Corp., a California
Corporation, and Mark Jones, Plaintiffs/
Appellants, vs. Utah Resources International Inc., a
Utah Corporation, John Fife, David Fife, Lyle D.
Hurd, Jr., Gerry Brown, individuals, Defendants/
Appellees : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rebecca S. Parr; Howrey, LLP; Craig M. White; Lucy C. Lisiecki; Wildman Harrold Allen & Dixon,
LLP; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
Reid W. Lambert; Woodbury & Kesler; Attorney for the Plaintiffs/Appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Mark Technologies v. Utah Resources International, No. 20041103 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5444
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARK TECHNOLOGIES CORP., a 
California Corporation, and MARK 
JONES, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH RESOURCES 
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, JOHN FIFE, DAVID FIFE, 
LYLE D. HURD, Jr., GERRY BROWN, 
individuals, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Court of Appeals No. 20041103-CA 
District Court No. 980900576 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Joseph C. Fratto 
Rebecca S. Parr 
HOWREY, LLP 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Craig M. White 
Lucy C. Lisiecki 
WILDMAN HARROLD 
ALLEN & DIXON, LLP 
225 W. Wacker Drive, Suite 3000 
Chicago, IL 60606-1229 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Reid W. Lambert 
Anthony M. Grover 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 3358 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3358 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
APR 1 0 2006 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARK TECHNOLOGIES CORP., a 
California Corporation, and MARK 
JONES, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH RESOURCES 
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, JOHN FIFE, DAVID FIFE, 
LYLE D. HURD, Jr., GERRY BROWN, 
individuals, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Rebecca S. Parr 
HOWREY, LLP 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Court of Appeals No. 20041103-CA 
District Court No. 980900576 
Reid W. Lambert 
Anthony M. Grover 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 3358 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3358 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Craig M. White 
Lucy C. Lisiecki 
WILDMAN HARROLD 
ALLEN & DIXON, LLP 
225 W. Wacker Drive, Suite 3000 
Chicago, IL 60606-1229 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Joseph C. Fratto 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 1 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
DEFENDANTS' DILIGENCE IN ATTEMPTING TO UNWIND URI 
FROM MGO AS THE TOUCHSTONE OF ITS "BEST EFFORTS" 
ANALYSIS 6 
A. The Law In Utah And Other Jurisdictions Does Not Support The 
Trial Court's Application Of A "Best Efforts" Standard Which Is 
The Functional Equivalent Of The Less Exacting "Good Faith" 
Standard 7 
B. The Settlement Agreement Itself Does Not Demonstrate That The 
Trial Court Applied The Correct "Best Efforts" Standard 9 
II. THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED 
IN ITS FACTUAL FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS EXERCISED 
THEIRBEST EFFORTS 12 
III. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES 
TO THE DEFENDANTS AS THE PREVAILING PARTY ON THE 
"BEST EFFORTS" CLAIM 12 
CONCLUSION 15 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 16 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436 (7th Cir. 1992) 7, 8 
Carlson Distributing Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing, Co., 95 P.3d 1171 (Utah App. 2004) . 7, 8 
Highland Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981) 12, 13, 14, 15 
Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States of America, 47 Fed CI. 236 (Fed. 
CI. 2000) 11 
Macksey v. Egan, 633 N.E.2d 408 (Mass.App.Ct. 1994) 9 
Nat'I Data Payment Sys. v. Meridian Bank, 212 F.3d 849 (3d Cir. 2000) 7 
Triple-A Baseball Club Assocs. v. Northeastern Baseball, Inc., 823 F.2d 214 (1st. Cir. 
1987) 8 
Western Geophysical Co. v. Bolt Assoc, 584 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1978) 8 
Other 
Black's Law Dictionary 152 (7th ed. 1999) 8 
ii 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Without restating the facts set forth in their principal brief, Appellants provide the 
following supplemental facts in response to the factual allegations set forth in the 
Defendants' brief. 
Groundwork Laid For Unwinding URI and MGO 
Defendants dedicate a substantial portion of their statement of the facts to their 
contention that the unwinding of URI and MGO presented complex matters which needed 
to be carefully resolved before the unwinding could occur. However, the record is clear 
that every significant matter related to the unwinding had been resolved by October of 
1996, two years prior to the settlement agreement that ultimately accomplished the 
unwinding. 
Even though it was not a party to the Settlement Agreement, MGO was motivated 
to complete its unwinding from URI as soon as possible. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 397.) 
On October 4, 1996, J. Michael Bennion ("Bennion"), the officer of MGO responsible 
for the unwinding, met with Ladd Eldredge ("Eldredge"), an employee of URI, to discuss 
the financial ramifications and liabilities the unwinding would present. (R. at 3465; 
Transcript at 395-396.) In a letter dated October 5, 1996, Bennion reported to John 
Morgan ("Morgan"), the CEO and Chairman of MGO, on his meeting with Eldredge and 
summarized each of the relevant issues related to the unwinding. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 10.) Bennion testified that during his meeting with Eldredge, he learned that 
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MGO owed URI money to pay for MGO's interest in various partnership assets, but that 
MGO never disputed those debts and that such debts never became a contention which 
hindered the unwinding process. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 397-399.) In short, there is no 
dispute that following the October 4, 1996 meeting, URI and MGO understood the 
financial liabilities of each party, and were fully prepared to proceed with the unwinding. 
Twenty Months Of Silence 
After meeting with Eldredge in October of 1996, URI suddenly and inexplicably 
broke off all communication with MGO for a period of twenty-months. Bennion testified 
that after the meeting with Eldredge, URI never contacted him to seek information or to 
propose further negotiations. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 400.) Bennion stated that at one 
point during URI's silence, he was instructed by MGO's board of directors to contact 
URI in an attempt to resuscitate the unwinding issue and work toward its completion. (R. 
at 3465; Transcript at 403-404.) Bennion wrote a letter to URI inquiring about the 
unwinding but never receive a response. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 404.) 
In addition to ignoring MGO's requests regarding the unwinding, URI was also 
ignoring the issue internally. Jenny Morgan, a member of URI's board of directors 
testified that through 1996 and 1997 URI's board gave no attention to the issue of 
unwinding from MGO and that the issue was "put off, rebuffed or ignored or not 
addressed." (R. at 3465; Transcript at 454.) Plaintiffs submitted into evidence the 
minutes from URI's board meetings that were held from June 5, 1996 through November 
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11, 1998 and the first time the URI board ever discussed the unwinding with MGO 
occurred on February 17, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5a-aa.) At that board 
meeting, the Defendants did not discuss any efforts that had been made during the prior 
two years or set forth any plan to actually accomplish the unwinding. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 5w.) Instead, the board simply passed a resolution authorizing Fife and the 
officers of URI to use their best efforts to complete the wind up of the MGO contracts. 
(R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5w.) The fact that the board's first mention of the unwinding 
was a resolution permitting Fife and the officers to use their "best efforts" is evidence that 
Defendants had not dedicated any effort, let alone their "best efforts," to the unwinding 
prior to that point. Without even considering the question of "best efforts," it was not 
until February of 1998, sixteen months after the October 4, 1996 meeting, that the 
Defendants began to exercise any efforts at all to address the unwinding. 
URI/MGO Partnership Assets 
As a partial explanation for their extended period of inactivity, Defendants attempt 
to establish that various assets of the URI/MGO partnership posed complex matters which 
needed to be carefully resolved before the unwinding could occur. In particular, 
Defendants suggest that the Service Station Partnership and Southgate Partnerships 
"presented unique challenges" that required considerable time to resolve. (Defendants' 
Brief at 12.) This allegation is false and contradicted by the factual record. 
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First, Defendants allege that the Service Station Partnership presented extensive 
environmental law issues due to an underground storage tank which had leaked, thereby 
affecting the financial liabilities of the parties. For purposes of the unwinding, however, 
the liability for any potential environmental cleanup was irrelevant. All parties agreed 
that MGO was a limited partner in the Service Station Partnership, and therefore, MGO 
was not responsible for any costs or liabilities beyond its capital contribution. (R. at 
3465; Transcript at 389-390.) The only issue the Service Station Partnership presented 
with regards to the unwinding was whether MGO owed any money to URI for payments 
that had not been made. This determination was not complicated especially considering 
MGO's willingness to complete the unwinding. Accordingly, the Service Station 
Partnership's liability for an environmental cleanup was not germane to URI's unwinding 
from MGO. 
Second, Defendants allege that the dissolution of the Southgate Partnerships 
presented an obstacle to completing the unwinding. (Defendants' Brief at 12.) This 
allegation is also erroneous. Resolution of the Southgate Partnership boiled down to 
assigning a one-third interest in a 6.6 acre plot of land to MGO. This was the extent of 
the negotiations necessary to resolve this issue for purposes of the unwinding. 
Accordingly, the Southgate Partnership was not a complex sticking point that required a 
twenty-month delay to resolve. 
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Defendants' contention that the URI/MGO partnership assets were an obstacle to 
the URI-MGO unwinding is not supported by the factual record. However, even if this 
Court were to assume for purposes of this appeal that the Service Station Partnership and 
Southgate Partnerships did present complex issues which hindered the unwinding 
process, the Defendants have failed to present any evidence that they addressed these 
issues in an attempt to resolve the problems. Plaintiffs contend that this failure further 
demonstrates the Defendants' failure to use their "best efforts" in attempting to facilitate 
the URI-MGO unwinding. 
The Morgan Factor 
Defendants also allege that a substantial amount of time was necessary to 
effectuate the unwinding because Fife was required to expend a great deal of time 
allaying Morgan's fears concerning the unwinding. (Defendants' Brief at 13-14.) 
However, the evidence is clear that Morgan was not only anxious to see the unwinding 
take place, but that he also held Fife in the highest esteem and trusted him. In a letter to 
MGO's officers and directors dated September 19, 1996, Morgan states that "we are 
working hard to get all the matters settled between URI and MGO" and that "[i] honestly 
believe we are making good headway in this matter." (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9.) 
Morgan continued, 
One of the greatest things we have going for us now, as I view it, is a guy 
by the name of John Fife. He not only obtained his MBA out of Harvard 
University Business School; but he is a leader who works so well with 
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people; and he seems to be a completely fair and reasonable and capable 
person. 
(R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9.) 
In light of this letter and the corroborating testimony of Bennion, Fife's gratuitous 
and vague statements regarding the need to build a relationship with Morgan are 
unpersuasive. Where Fife could not point to a single specific meeting or conversation 
with Morgan that served the purpose of overcoming Morgan's fears about Fife or the 
unwinding, the great weight of the evidence supports only the conclusion that the delay 
was due to neglect and not to any other purpose. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
DEFENDANTS' DILIGENCE IN ATTEMPTING TO UNWIND URI 
FROM MGO AS THE TOUCHSTONE OF ITS "BEST EFFORTS" 
ANALYSIS. 
In their brief, the Defendants argue that the trial court applied the correct legal 
standard for determining "best efforts" where: (1) the law in Utah and other jurisdictions 
supports the trial court's conclusions of law, and (2) the Settlement Agreement itself 
demonstrates that the trial court applied a correct standard of "best efforts." Plaintiffs 
contend that the Defendants' arguments fail on both counts 
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A. The Law In Utah And Other Jurisdictions Does Not Support 
The Trial Court's Application Of A "Best Efforts" Standard 
Which Is The Functional Equivalent Of The Less Exacting 
"Good Faith" Standard. 
In order to differentiate between the usual contractual duty of "good faith" and the 
more exacting standard of "best efforts," a court must look to the diligence a party has 
exercised in its attempt to fulfill its obligation. See Nat 7 Data Payment Sys. v. Meridian 
Bank, 212 F.3d 849, 854 (3d Cir. 2000). Courts have crafted this distinction to avoid the 
muddling of the "best efforts" and "good faith" standards, a trap to which many courts 
have fallen victim. See Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1445 (7th 
Cir. 1992). In this case, the trial court erred by failing to consider the Defendants' 
diligence, or lack thereof, as the touchstone of its "best efforts" analysis, thereby 
rendering its analysis as the functional equivalent of the less exacting standard of "good 
faith." 
Defendants cite Carlson Distributing Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing, Co., 95 P.3d 1171 
(Utah App. 2004), in support of their contention that the trial court applied the correct 
"best efforts" legal standard. In Carlson, this Court rejected an objective analysis of "best 
efforts" which simply juxtaposes the capability and efforts of an "average, prudent, [and] 
comparable party" to the capability and efforts of the party whose conduct is at issue. Id. 
at 1179. This Court held that the "best efforts" standard is primarily a subjective one 
which does not compare one party's capabilities to that of another. Id. at 1179. 
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Plaintiffs agree that pursuant to Carlson the "best efforts" standard is subjective in 
nature and that courts should look to the particular circumstances of the party to 
determine whether it has exercised its best efforts. However, this Court's decision in 
Carlson did not provide any guidance regarding how a court differentiates between 
actions which qualify as "best efforts" and those that merely satisfy the standard of "good 
faith." Accordingly, Plaintiffs contend that when applying this subjective standard, a 
court must look to the degree of diligence a party has exercised to determine whether it 
has truly put forth its "best efforts." A subjective analysis which fails to consider how 
diligently a party has acted is nothing more than the application of a "good faith" 
standard, which only judges the subjective intent of a party, rather than the diligence with 
which it has acted. 
In this case, the Defendants have alleged that the trial court "did not apply a 'good 
faith' standard." (Defendants' Brief at 21.) However, the Defendants have failed to 
explain why other courts such as the Seventh Circuit in Beraha, the First Circuit in 
Triple-A Baseball Club Assocs. v. Northeastern Baseball, Inc. 823 F.2d 214, 225-226 
(1st. Cir. 1987), and the Second Circuit in Western Geophysical Co. v. Bolt Assoc, 584 
F.2d 1164, 1170-1171 (2d Cir. 1978) have all held that "best efforts" requires that a party 
exercise "due diligence." As noted in its principal brief, by its very definition "best 
efforts" means the "diligent attempts to carry out an obligation." Black's Law Dictionary 
152 (7th ed. 1999)(emphasis added.) Diligence is the touchstone of the "best efforts" 
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analysis and requires that a party "put its muscles to work to perform with the full energy 
and fairness that the promises and reasonable implications of the contract require." 
Macksey v. Egan, 633 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Mass.App.Cti. 1994). 
In this case, the trial court conducted a subjective analysis that looked to the 
Defendants' intent and the reasonableness of its actions rather than scrutinizing the 
Defendants' diligence, or lack thereof, in the fulfillment of its contractual obligation to 
unwind from MGO. Accordingly, the trial court committed an error of law by effectively 
muddling the "best efforts" standard with that of "good faith." 
B. The Settlement Agreement Itself Does Not Demonstrate That The Trial 
Court Applied The Correct "Best Efforts" Standard, 
Defendants argue that because there was no time frame assigned to the unwinding 
provision of the Settlement Agreement, the mere fact that URI and MGO were ultimately 
unwound is sufficient to establish that the trial court applied the correct "best efforts" 
standard. This argument mistakes the nature of the Defendants' obligation under the 
Settlement Agreement as well as the Plaintiffs' claim. 
While Plaintiffs acknowledge that other provisions of the Settlement Agreement 
may have set forth specific time limitations, Plaintiffs do not agree that the absence of a 
time frame from the unwinding provision alters the nature of the "best efforts" standard. 
Plaintiffs contend that even in the absence of a stated time frame, the Defendants 
were obligated to use their "best efforts" to accomplish the URI-MGO unwinding from 
the time the Settlement Agreement was entered into until the unwinding was completed. 
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The obligation was not limited to a period of sixty days or "immediately following the 
[c] losing" as other provisions of the Settlement Agreement were. Additionally, the 
Settlement Agreement did not impose a time frame for the URI-MGO unwinding because 
one of the key players in the unwinding, MGO, was not a party to the Settlement 
Agreement and was therefore not required to cooperate in the unwinding or use its best 
efforts to do so. 
In paragraphs l.a and l.b, the "best efforts" provisions applied exclusively to each 
of the parties to the Settlement Agreement. Each party was contractually obligated to use 
their "best efforts" and the time frames were included as an impetus for the parties to 
fulfill their obligations to each other. However, in the case of the unwinding provision, 
MGO was not a party to the Settlement Agreement, and was therefore not required to 
abide by its provisions. Therefore, a time frame for the completion of the unwinding 
would be futile where MGO was under no obligation to even cooperate with URL 
Accordingly, the Defendants' obligation with respect to the unwinding provision was not 
to actually accomplish the unwinding, but rather, to exercise their "best efforts" in an 
attempt to do so. 
Mindful of the Defendants' obligation, the Plaintiffs have only sought to enforce 
the benefit of the bargain they received by way of the Settlement Agreement, namely, that 
Defendants diligently exercise their best efforts to accomplish the URI-MGO unwinding, 
not that the unwinding actually take place or that it take place within a given time frame. 
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|n Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States of America, 47 Fed CI. 236 
(Fed. CI. 2000), the Court of Federal Claims held that under a best efforts contract, the 
promisor is required to use its best efforts to fulfill its obligation; if, despite its best 
efforts, the promisor cannot meet the contractual requirements, the other party has 
pbtained precisely what is bargained for, namely, the promisor's best efforts. 
In this case, the Defendants have mistakenly assumed that Plaintiffs are seeking to 
impose a time frame on the unwinding provision or trying to "re-write the contract to 
include a term that could have been included, but was not." (Defendants' Brief at 22-23.) 
This is not the case. Plaintiffs are simply seeking the benefit of what they bargained for 
as part of the Settlement Agreement, namely, that Defendants exercise their best efforts in 
attempting to accomplish the URI-MGO unwinding. The fact that the unwinding 
f ccurred only evidences that the unwinding was possible and that MGO was a willing 
participant. However, where Defendants' contractual obligation was to use their "best 
efforts," the question of whether a time frame for the unwinding's completion was 
included or whether the unwinding ultimately occurred is irrelevant to the Defendants' 
obligation. The only relevant question is whether the Defendants actually used their "best 
efforts" to accomplish the unwinding. Plaintiffs contend that where the Defendants only 
began to exercise their "best efforts" to work towards the URI-MGO unwinding after the 
plaintiffs' filed their lawsuit, that the Defendants failed in their "best efforts" obligation. 
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II. THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED 
IN ITS FACTUAL FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS EXERCISED 
THEIR BEST EFFORTS. 
The best evidence in this case of the trial court's failure to apply the correct legal 
standard for determining "best efforts" is the court's factual finding that the Defendants 
had in fact exercised their "best efforts." Had the trial court considered diligence as the 
essence of its analysis, it would have held that Defendants failed to use their "best 
efforts" to unwind URI and MGO where MGO was a motivated and anxious partner to 
the unwinding. 
The arguments and facts set forth in the Plaintiffs' principal brief along with the 
Statement of Additional Facts as contained in this reply brief, adequately address the 
question of whether the trial court erred in holding that the Defendants used their "best 
efforts." Defendants have advanced no argument and presented no facts which contradict 
the overwhelming weight of the evidence that URI ignored the unwinding issue for a 
period of twenty-months and even rebuffed MGO's attempts to address the issue. As set 
forth in those arguments and statements of fact, the trial court erroneously found that 
Defendants exercised their "best efforts." 
III. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES 
TO THE DEFENDANTS AS THE PREVAILING PARTY ON THE 
"BEST EFFORTS" CLAIM. 
Utah law is clear that a party is deemed a prevailing party if the opposing party's 
tardy compliance with an obligation comes as a result of a lawsuit. Highland Constr. Co. 
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v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1981). In their brief, Defendants argue that 
Highland is not applicable to this case because the Defendants have not admitted any 
liability to the Plaintiffs as the Defendant in Highland did and where they argue there is 
po temporal connection between the filing of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit and the URI-MGO 
unwinding. Both of these arguments should be rejected by this Court. 
In Highland, Highland Construction brought an action against Stevenon, the 
general contractor and utilities subcontractor, for damages allegedly caused by defective 
Constructive plans and unreasonable delays. Id. at 1034. Highland Construction was 
deemed the prevailing party in that action because 164 days after the lawsuit was filed, 
Stevenson admitted liability and paid Highland Construction damages in the exact amount 
|t had sued for. Id. at 1038. The Utah Supreme Court held that since the debt was long 
pverdue when it was paid by Stevenson, and since the debt was paid only after Highland 
Construction filed its lawsuit, that Highland Construction was indeed the prevailing party. 
u 
Defendants attempt to distinguish Highland on the grounds that Defendants have 
not admitted that they failed to use their "best efforts," whereas in Highland, Stevenson 
admitted his liability. However, the key factor in Highland was not the admission of 
liability, but rather, the payment of the damages long overdue to Highland Construction. 
Similarly in this case, Plaintiffs should be considered the "prevailing party" for purposes 
of the fee award where as a result of filing their lawsuit, the Defendants began to comply 
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with their overdue duty to exercise "best efforts." Whether Defendants admit they used 
their "best efforts" or not is irrelevant, the key factor is whether the Defendants began to 
use their "best efforts" only after the Plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed. As extensively briefed 
in the Plaintiffs' principal brief, the record in this case is clear that only after Plaintiffs' 
filed their lawsuit to enforce the Settlement Agreement did the Defendants begin to 
exercise their "best efforts" to accomplish the URI-MGO unwinding. Accordingly, 
Highland is applicable in this case, and pursuant to its reasonsing, Plaintiffs should be 
considered the "prevailing party" for purposes of their claim. 
Defendants also argue that Highland is in applicable where Stevenson paid the fine 
within 164 days of the suit being filed, whereas in this case the URI-MGO windup 
occurred eleven months after the Plaintiffs filed suit. Plaintiffs contend that the relevant 
time frame this Court should look to is not the time between the filing of the Plaintiffs' 
lawsuit and the ultimate URI-MGO unwinding as the Defendants suggest, but rather, the 
time that elapsed between the filing of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit and the beginning of the 
Defendants' exercise of their "best efforts." As stated earlier, the Plaintiffs' suit sought 
not to compel the URI-MGO unwinding, but rather, the fulfillment of the Defendants' 
contractual obligation to use their "best efforts." When this Court looks at the appropriate 
time frame, there was a lapse of approximately thirty days in this case between the time 
the Plaintiffs filed their suit and the first sign that the Defendants' began to use their best 
efforts to accomplish the unwinding. 
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If Highland Construction was deemed the prevailing party for causing the payment 
bf damages due within 164 days of filing its complaint, the trial court erred in not 
considering the Plaintiffs the prevailing party where Defendants began to use their "best 
efforts" within thirty days after the Plaintiffs filed their complaint which sought to compel 
the Defendants to use their "best efforts." 
Defendants' argument that Highland is inapplicable in this case should be rejected. 
Plaintiffs contend that where the Defendants only began to display any diligence in their 
attempt to unwind URI and MGO after the Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit seeking 
enforcement of the "best efforts" provision, that according to Highland, Plaintiffs should 
be considered the prevailing party for purposes of their "best efforts" claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to reverse the 
decision of the trial court on the Plaintiffs' "best efforts" claim and award attorneys fees 
to the Plaintiffs as the prevailing party accordingly. 
)ATED this JJ2^ day of April, 2006. 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
i ' 
Ceid W>Lambert 
Anthony M. Grovi 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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